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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the physical layer
security of a full-duplex base station (BS) aided system in the
worst case, where an uplink transmitter (UT) and a downlink
receiver (DR) are both equipped with a single antenna, while
a powerful eavesdropper is equipped with multiple antennas.
For securing the confidentiality of signals transmitted from the
BS and UT, an artificial noise (AN) aided secrecy beamforming
scheme is proposed, which is robust to the realistic imperfect
state information of both the eavesdropping channel and the
residual self-interference channel. Our objective function is that
of maximizing the worst-case sum secrecy rate achieved by the
BS and UT, through jointly optimizing the beamforming vector
of the confidential signals and the transmit covariance matrix
of the AN. However, the resultant optimization problem is non-
convex and non-linear. In order to efficiently obtain the solution,
we transform the non-convex problem into a sequence of convex
problems by adopting the block coordinate descent algorithm.
We invoke a linear matrix inequality for finding its Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) solution. In order to evaluate the achievable
performance, the worst-case secrecy rate is derived analytically.
Furthermore, we construct another secrecy transmission scheme
using the projection matrix theory for performance comparison.
Our simulation results show that the proposed robust secrecy
transmission scheme achieves substantial secrecy performance
gains, which verifies the efficiency of the proposed method.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, full-duplex, artificial
noise, secrecy beamforming, secrecy rate
I. INTRODUCTION
Full-duplex (FD) communication has the potential of dou-
bling the spectral efficiency compared to its half-duplex
counterpart. The main challenge facing FD systems is the
increased self-interference imposed by the leakage from the
transmitted signals to the signals received at the FD node.
Sophisticated techniques, such as TX/RX antenna separation
and isolation, as well as digital/analog/propagation domain
interference cancellation, have been proposed for combating
the self-interference [1], [2]. Thus the design of a single-
channel FD system becomes feasible.
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On the other hand, exploiting artificial noise (AN) [3]
has been widely recognized as an effective technique of
improving the physical layer security (PLS) [4]–[9] of wireless
communications. By transmitting AN in addition to the con-
fidential signals, the quality of the eavesdropping channel is
degraded. However, existing AN based PLS schemes cannot
be used for securing uplink (UL) transmissions in conven-
tional FDD/TDD cellular systems [10], [11], because i) the
base stations (BSs) cannot transmit AN while receiving co-
channel desired signals; ii) an UL transmitter (UT) typically
has a single transmit antenna that can only be used for
transmitting desired information-bearing signals to a BS, and
no more antennas are available for transmitting AN. Notably,
FD techniques provide a solution to such a dilemma, since
an FD transceiver is capable of receiving the confidential
signals, while simultaneously transmitting AN in order to jam
potential eavesdroppers (Eves). The authors of [12] proposed
a user-grouping-based fractional time model relying either on
perfect channel state information (CSI) or on statistical CSI.
Assuming perfect self-interference suppression, the authors of
[13] studied the joint design of the confidential signal and AN
for maximizing the instantaneous secrecy rate achieved by the
legitimate downlink (DL) receiver (DR), while keeping the
received secrecy rate at the FD BS above a predefined target.
By contrast, assuming imperfect self-interference cancellation,
the authors of [14] studied the joint design of the confidential
signal and AN for minimizing the total transmit power, while
keeping the achievable secrecy rate of the FD BS and of the
DR above a predefined target. Furthermore, the authors of [15]
proposed a pair of relay-assisted secure protocols by relying on
the FD capability of an orthogonal frequency division multiple
access (OFDMA) system.
However, none of the aforementioned contributions con-
sidered the scenario of realistic imperfect CSI, even though
only imperfect eavesdropping channel information might be
gleaned by the BS - if any at all - since typically the Eves
sends no training signals to the BS.
Although the authors of [16], [17] analyzed the secrecy out-
age probability in an imperfect eavesdropper CSI knowledge
scenario for a FD relay system, the eavesdropper was only
equipped with a single antenna and the source was unable to
communicate with the destination directly.
Hence, more realistic practical problems have to be con-
sidered. More specifically, the security in the DL and UL
have to be considered simultaneously, and the sum secrecy
rate of the DL and UL should be optimized in the face of a
2“sophisticated/strong” eavesdropper having imperfect CSI1.
In contrast to [12]–[16], in this paper, our new contribution
is that we jointly design the beamforming vector of the con-
fidential signal and the covariance matrix of the AN, in order
to maximize the worst-case2 sum secrecy rate achieved by the
FD BS and the UT, under the realistic assumption that only
imperfect state information of the residual self-interference
channel and of the eavesdropping channel is available to the
FD BS.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no open literature
addressing the simultaneous optimization of the sum secrecy
rate of the DL and UL in the face of realistic CSI error
concerning a “sophisticated/strong” eavesdropper’s channel in
the above-mentionedfworst-case FD scenario. Since the worst-
case optimization problem is considered, in the paper, we
adopt the deterministic model of [18], [19] to characterize the
imperfect channel state information (CSI). Because the resul-
tant objective function considered is non-convex, the global
optimum is hard to obtain. As a low-complexity suboptimal
method, the block coordinate descent (BCD) algorithm of
[20, Section 2.7] is adopted to transform the non-convex and
non-linear problem into a sequence of convex problems. In
other words, without using any approximation method such
as the classic semi-definite relaxation (SDR) technique, we
transform our non-convex and non-linear problem into a more
well-behaved form and conceive an efficient algorithm for
finding its Karush-Kuhn-Tucke(KKT) solution. Then the lo-
cally optimal solution of the original problem is obtained. Our
analysis and simulation results reveal valuable insights into
how several relevant design parameters affect the achievable
secrecy performance of the system considered; compared to
projection matrix theory, the proposed robust secrecy trans-
mission scheme is capable of achieving substantial secrecy
performance gains.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model and the problem formulation are described.
In Section III, we transform the original non-convex problem
into a sequence of convex problems and invoke an iterative
BCD algorithm for finding its Karush-Kuhn-Tucke(KKT) so-
lution. Our simulation results are provided in Section IV, and
the conclusions are offered in Section V.
Notation: (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H denote the transpose, conju-
gate and conjugate transpose, respectively. (·)−1, tr(·), and
|| · ||F denote the inverse, trace, and Frobenius norm of a
matrix, respectively. ln(·) denotes the natural logarithm, and
⊗ represents the Kronecker product.
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Fig. 1. A cellular system composed of a multi-antenna FD BS, a single-
antenna UT, a single-antenna DR, and a multi-antenna Eve.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Transmission Model
We consider an FD cellular system composed of an FD BS,
a single-antenna legitimate DR, a single-antenna legitimate UT
and a powerful multi-antenna Eve, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The UT and BS are scheduled for UL and DL transmission
respectively, in the same frequency band. We assume that the
Eve has NE receiving antennas, while the FD BS has NT
transmitting antennas and NR receiving antennas to facilitate
simultaneous transmission and reception. Additionally, we
assume NT ≥ NE + 1, so that the BS has sufficient degrees
of freedom to transmit the AN. As shown in Fig. 1, the DL
channels from the BS to the DR and to the Eve are denoted
by hHB ∈ C
1×NT and HE ∈ C
NE×NT , respectively, while the
UL channels from the UT to the BS, the Eve and the DR are
denoted by gB ∈ CNR×1, gE ∈ CNE×1, and g, respectively.
Finally, HL ∈ CNR×NT denotes the residual self-interference
channel due to the imperfect self-interference cancellation [2].
In the DL transmission, the BS transmits the confidential
information-bearing signals together with the AN to protect
the confidential information from wiretapping. The baseband
signal from the BS can be expressed as
xb , vs+ na, (1)
where s ∼ CN (0, 1)3 is the confidential information-bearing
signal, v ∈ CNT×1 denotes the beamforming vector, and na ∼
CN (0,Ω) denotes the AN. The total available power of the
BS is denoted by Ptot, while the design of v and na must
satisfy the following power constraint:
tr
(
vvH +Ω
)
≤ Ptot. (2)
1The eavesdropper is said to be “sophisticated/strong”, for example when it
has multiple antennas or when the number of eavesdropper antennas is higher
than that of each legitimate UT and DR, or alternatively, when it sends no
training signals to the BS.
2In this treatise, we consider the worst-case scenario, where the UT and
DR are equipped with a single antenna, while the “sophisticated/strong”
eavesdropper is equipped with multiple antennas. Furthermore, when only
imperfect eavesdropping channel knowledge is available to the BS. In such
cases, the capacity of the eavesdropper is potentially higher than that of the
legitimate user. Naturally, this scenario is more challenging than the case
where the legitimate users have the same capability as the eavesdropper.
3This assumption is widely adopted in the studies on physical layer security,
which facilitates the calculation of the secrecy rate [13], [14], [18], [19].
3Let us assume z ∼ CN (0, 1) is the confidential signal
transmitted from the UT and its transmit power is Pt. In a
scheduled slot, the signals received at the BS, the DR and the
Eve can be expressed as
yB = r
H
(√
PtgBz +HLxb + nB
)
, (3)
yD = h
H
Bxb +
√
Ptgz + nD, (4)
yE = HExb +
√
PtgEz + nE , (5)
respectively, where nB , nD , nE denote the received noise
having a zero mean and unit variance/identity covariance ma-
trix. Since the perfect state information of HL is unavailable
to the BS, the maximum ratio combining (MRC) receiver,
instead of the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) receiver,
is assumed to be adopted at the BS for maximizing the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of the received confidential signal. The
MRC receiver adopted is defined by r = gB||gB||F , hence we
have ||r||F = 1.
B. Channel State Information Model
We consider the quasi-stationary flat-fading channels and
assume that the UL/DL pair of channels exhibits reciprocity.
At the beginning of the scheduled slot, the BS obtains the
CSI of all legitimate channels via training. In practice, the
DR broadcasts training sequences to facilitate the UL channel
estimation, thus hHB may be estimated at the BS and the inter-
terminal interference channel g may be estimated at the UT.
Then, the UT can embed g into its own training sequence
and broadcast the composite sequence. As a result, both g and
gB can be acquired at the BS. By contrast, the residual self-
interference channel HL after adopting digital/analog domain
cancellation techniques remains unknown [2]. Additionally,
due to the lack of explicit cooperation between the legitimate
network nodes and the Eve, perfect knowledge of the wiretap
channels is difficult to obtain at the legitimate network nodes.
Hence, we assume that the BS can only acquire imperfect
estimates of HE and gE , and we have
HE = H¯E +∆HE , gE = g¯E +∆gE , (6)
where H¯E and g¯E denote the estimates of HE and gE ,
respectively, while ∆HE and ∆gE denote the corresponding
estimation error [21]–[25]. This model is sufficiently generic
for characterizing different types of wiretap channels. More
specifically, when the Eve is constituted by an active sub-
scriber, the perfect CSI of the wiretap channel will be available
to the associated network nodes, indicating ∆HE = 0 and
∆gE = 0. On the other hand, when the Eve is completely
passive, the BS and UT may know nothing about the CSI
of the wiretap channels, implying that H¯E and g¯E can take
arbitrary values.
We characterize the uncertainty associated with the CSI
estimation and residual self-interference channel by the widely
adopted deterministic uncertainty model [18], [19]. In this
model, HL, ∆HE , and ∆gE are bounded by the sets ξHL ,
{HL : ||HL||F ≤ δHL}, ξHE , {∆HE : ||∆HE ||F ≤ δHE}
and ξgE , {∆gE : ||∆gE ||F ≤ δgE}, respectively, where
δHL , δHE and δgE are some given constants. Relying on
this deterministic model, we optimize the system’s secrecy
performance under the worst-case channel conditions. This
approach guarantees the absolute robustness of the system
design, since the achievable secrecy performance would be
no worse than that of the worst case.
C. Problem Formulation
We seek to optimize the beamformer v and the covariance
matrix Ω of AN in order to maximize the worst-case sum
secrecy rate. Defining Q = vvH , we can obtain
max
v,Ω0
min
∆HE∈ξHE ,HL∈ξHL ,∆gE∈ξgE
ln (1 + η1) + ln (1 + η2)
− ln det
(
INE + ZN
−1
)
s.t. rank (Q) = 1,
tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot, (7)
where η1 ,
hH
B
QhB
Pt|g|2+hHBΩhB+1
, η2 ,
Pt||gB||
2
F
rHHL(Q+Ω)HHL r+1
, Z ,
HEQH
H
E + PtgEg
H
E , N , HEΩH
H
E + INE .
III. ROBUST JOINT BEAMFORMING AND AN DESIGN: AN
ITERATIVE APPROACH
The max-min problem (7) is non-convex. In the following,
let us transform (7) into a sequence of convex programming
problems.
Employing [18, Proposition 1] and [26, Lemma 4.1], we
obtain the following equivalent relation:
− ln
(
Pt|g|
2 + hHBΩhB + 1
)
=
max
a1>0
[
−a1
(
Pt|g|
2 + hHBΩhB + 1
)
+ ln a1 + 1
]
, (8)
− ln
[
1 + rHHL
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHL r
]
=
max
a2>0
{
−a2
[
1 + rHHL
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHL r
]
+ ln a2 + 1
}
,
(9)
− ln det
[
INE +HE
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHE + PtgEg
H
E
]
=
NE + max
WE0
[ln det (WE)− tr (WEX)] , (10)
where X , INE + HE
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHE + PtgEg
H
E . Then,
expanding the objective function of (7) and invoking the above
relationship, we have
max
a1>0,a2>0,WE0
Q0,Ω0
Ξ (a1, a2,WE ,Q,Ω) (11a)
s.t. rank (Q) = 1, (11b)
tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot, (11c)
where the objective function (11a) is given in the equation
(12).
4Ξ (a1, a2,WE ,Q,Ω) , ln
(
hHBvv
HhB + Pt|g|
2 + hHBΩhB + 1
)
− a1
(
Pt|g|
2 + hHBΩhB + 1
)
+ ln a1 + 1+
ln
(
Pt||gB||
2
F + r
HHL
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHL r+ 1
)
− a2
[
1 + rHHL
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHL r
]
+ ln a2 + 1−NE + ln det (WE)
− tr (WEX) + lndet
(
INE +HEΩH
H
E
)
(12)
F (a1, a2, α, β, γ,WE ,Q,Ω) , ln
(
1 + Pt|g|
2 + hHB (Q+Ω)hB
)
− a1
(
Pt|g|
2 + hHBΩhB + 1
)
+ ln a1 + 1
− a2 (1 + α) + ln a2 + 1 + ln
(
1 + Pt||gB||
2
F + α
)
+ ln det (WE)− tr (WE)− β − Ptγ + ln det (INE +M) (17)
λβ
[
INT×NE 0
0 −δ2HE
]
−

 (Q+Ω)T ⊗WE
(
(Q+Ω)
T ⊗WE
)
vec
(
H¯E
)
vec
(
H¯E
)H (
(Q+Ω)
T ⊗WE
)
vec
(
H¯E
)H (
(Q+Ω)
T ⊗WE
)
vec
(
H¯E
)
− β

  0, ∃λβ ≥ 0.
(19)
By introducing optimization variables α, β, γ, the problem
(11) can be reformulated as
max
a1>0,a2>0,WE0
α>0,β>0,Q0,Ω0
F (a1, a2, α, β, γ,WE ,Q,Ω)
s.t. α ≥ rHHL (Q+Ω)H
H
L r, ∀HL ∈ ξHL ; (13a)
β ≥ tr
(
WE
(
HE (Q+Ω)H
H
E
))
, ∀∆HE ∈ ξ∆HE ;
(13b)
γ ≥ tr
(
WE
(
PtgEg
H
E
))
, ∀∆gE ∈ ξ∆gE ; (13c)
M  HEΩH
H
E ∀∆HE ∈ ξ∆HE ; (13d)
rank (Q) = 1; (13e)
tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot, (13f)
where the objective function F (a1, a2, α, β, γ,WE,Q,Ω) is
defined in (17).
Let us first transform the constraint (13a) into a more
convenient formulation:
rHHL (Q+Ω)H
H
L r = tr
(
rrHHL (Q+Ω)H
H
L
)
(a)
= (vec (HL))
H
(
(Q+Ω)T ⊗ rrH
)
vec (HL) , (14)
where the equation (a) is due to the following equation:
tr (ABCD) =
(
vec
(
DT
))T (
CT ⊗A
)
vec (B) . (15)
With similar procedures, the constraint (13b) - (13c) can be
transformed into a more convenient formulation, and the non-
convex problem (7) can be equivalently reformulated as:
max
a1>0,a2>0,WE0
α>0,β>0,Q0,Ω0
F (a1, a2, α, β, γ,WE ,Q,Ω)
s.t. α ≥ (vec (HL))
H
(
(Q+Ω)
T ⊗ rrH
)
vec (HL) ,
∀HL ∈ ξHL ; (16a)
β ≥ (vec (∆HE))
H
(
(Q+Ω)
T ⊗WHE
)
vec (∆HE)+
2Re
(
(vec (∆HE))
H
(
(Q+Ω)
T ⊗WHE
)
vec
(
H¯E
))
+
vec
(
H¯E
)H (
(Q+Ω)T ⊗WHE
)
vec
(
H¯E
)
,
∀∆HE ∈ ξ∆HE ; (16b)
γ ≥ ∆gHEWE∆gE + 2Re
(
∆gHEWE g¯E
)
+ g¯HEWE g¯E ,
∀∆gE ∈ ξ∆gE ; (16c)
M  ∆HEΩ∆H
H
E +∆HEΩH¯
H
E + H¯EΩ∆H
H
E
+ H¯EΩH¯
H
E , ∀∆HE ∈ ξ∆HE ; (16d)
rank (Q) = 1; (16e)
tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot. (16f)
The resultant problem (16) still remains challenging to
solve. To obtain a more tractable problem, the following
reformulation is carried out.
According to the eigenvalue equation, the constraint (16a)
can be rewritten as
α ≥ δ2HLλmax
(
(Q+Ω)T ⊗ rrH
)
, (18)
where λmax is the maximal eigenvalue of (Q+Ω)
T ⊗ rrH .
According to the S-Procedure [28], the constraints (16b) and
(16c) hold if and only if there exist λβ ≥ 0 and λγ ≥ 0 such
that (19) and (20) hold:
λγ
[
INT×NE 0
0 −δ2gE
]
−
[
WE WEg¯E
g¯HEWE g¯
H
EWE g¯E − γ
]
 0,
∃λγ ≥ 0. (20)
5Then, invoking the robust quadratic matrix inequality of
[29], the constraint (16d) holds if and only if there exists a
value λM ≥ 0 such that[
H¯EΩH¯
H
E −M H¯EΩ
ΩH¯HE Ω
]
− λM
[
INE 0
0 − 1
δ2
HE
]
 0,
∃λM ≥ 0. (21)
Finally, invoking the classic semidefinite relaxation (SDR)
technique [5], [27], we drop the constraint (16e) to obtain the
rank-relaxation version of (16).
As a result, the robust joint design of the confidential
signal’s beamforming vector v and the covariance matrix Ω
of the AN can be reformulated as
max
a1>0,a2>0,WE0
α>0,β>0,Q0,Ω0
F (a1, a2, α, β, γ,WE ,Q,Ω)
s.t. (18), (19), (20), (21) and (16f). (22)
Now, although the problem (22) itself still remains non-
convex and its global optimum is difficult to obtain, it can
be decomposed into two sub-problems that are convex. Then,
we can adopt the efficient BCD algorithm of [20, Section
2.7] to find a sequence of locally optimal solutions of (22).
More specifically, in this method, all optimization variables are
decoupled into two blocks: {α, β,Q,Ω} and {a1, a2,WE}.
Note that when the block {a1, a2,WE} is fixed, the problem
(22) becomes convex with respect to {α, β,Q,Ω}, and when
the block {α, β,Q,Ω} is fixed, the problem (22) becomes
convex with respect to {a1, a2,WE}. Hence, the two blocks
of variables can be optimized in turn with low complexity by
fixing one block and optimizing the other.4
The BCD algorithm employed is summarized in Algorithm
1. Since Algorithm 1 yields non-descending objective function
values, it must converge subject to the plausible constraint that
physically the secrecy rate is finite.
Given Algorithm 1, the optimal Q can be found by solving
(22). However, there is no guarantee that rank (Q) = 1
and that v can be derived from Q without any performance
deterioration. In the following, we propose a simple method
of constructing v from Q with good guaranteed performance,
as summarized in Algorithm 2.
Proposition 1. The secrecy performance achieved by Qˆ con-
structed in Algorithm 2 is not inferior to the one achieved by
Q.
Proof. The objective function value of the problem (7) rep-
resents the achievable secrecy rate performance. Then, let us
replace vvH by Qˆ and Q, respectively, in the problem (7) to
give the proof.
Firstly, we have the following linear matrix inquality
Q− Qˆ = Q1/2
(
I−
Q1/2hBh
H
BQ
1/2
hHBQhB
)
Q1/2  0. (23)
4As pointed out in [31], the combination of substantially increased comput-
ing power, sophisticated algorithms, and new coding approaches has made it
possible to solve modest-sized convex optimization problems on microsecond
or millisecond time scales and with strict completion deadlines. This enables
real-time convex optimization in signal processing. In fact, this time-scale
is also similar to a single transmission time interval (TTI) in 4G LTE (one
millisecond) and in 5G NR (a fraction of one millisecond).
Algorithm 1 The BCD algorithm for solving the robust joint
optimization problem (22).
Set l = 1 and perform initialization with arbitrary feasible
a¯1(l), a¯2(l),W¯E(l) .
while the difference between the values of
F
(
a¯1(l), a¯2(l), α¯(l), β¯(l), γ¯(l),W¯E(l), Q¯(l), Ω¯(l)
)
in
successive iterations is larger than φ for some φ > 0, do
1. Solve the problem (22) by fixing a1 = a¯1(l), a2 =
a¯2(l),WE = W¯E(l), and obtain the global optimum, i.e.,
α∗, β∗, γ∗,Q∗,Ω∗.
2. Set α¯(l) = α∗, β¯(l) = β∗, γ¯(l) = γ∗, Q¯(l) = Q∗, and
Ω¯(l) = Ω∗.
3. Solve the problem (22) by fixing α = α¯(l), β = β¯(l), γ =
γ¯(l),Q = Q¯(l),Ω = Ω¯(l) and obtain the global optimum, i.e.,
a∗1, a
∗
2,W
∗
E .
4. l = l + 1,
5. Set a¯1(l) = a
∗
1, a¯2(l) = a
∗
2, and W¯E(l) =W
∗
E .
end while
Output: Q,Ω.
Algorithm 2 The proposed BCD algorithm for solving the robust
joint optimization problem (22).
1. Set Qˆ =
QhBh
H
B
Q
hH
B
QhB
.
2. v is generated from Qˆ by singular value decomposition.
Thus, tr (Q) ≥ tr
(
Qˆ
)
. Then, we can conclude that if Q
satisfies the power constraint of the problem (7), Qˆ should
also satisfy this power constraint.
Next, let us check the objective function of the problem (7),
where vvH appears in the numerator of η1, in the denominator
of η2, as well as in Z. Then, for establishing the proof, the
following inequalities must be proved:
hHBQhB ≤ h
H
B QˆhB, (24)
rHHLQH
H
L r ≥ r
HHLQˆH
H
L r, (25)
HEQH
H
E  HEQˆH
H
E . (26)
Observe that (24) holds true, since hHB QˆhB = h
H
BQhB .
Additionally, since Q − Qˆ  0, (25) and (26) also hold
true.
The following proposition shows that the limit points gen-
erated by Algorithm 1 would satisfy the KKT condition of the
problem (7).
Proposition 2. The limit point of the sequence{
a¯1(l), a¯3(l), α¯(l), β¯(l), γ¯(l),W¯E(l), Q¯(l), Ω¯(l)
}
generated
by Algorithm 1, i.e.,
{
a¯∗1, a¯
∗
3, α¯
∗, β¯∗, γ¯∗,W¯∗E , Q¯
∗, Ω¯∗
}
is a
KKT point of the nonconvex optimization problem (7).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulations, we assume that all the available channel
coefficients obey CN (0, 1). The transmit power of the UT
is set to Pt = 20 dBm and the received noise power is
normalized to 0 dBm. The simulation results were obtained
by averaging over 200 independent trials. With the obtained v
and Ω, the achievable worst-case sum secrecy rate Rw can
610 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Ptot(dBm)
Av
er
ag
e 
R w
 
(B
its
/s/
Hz
)
 
 
δgE = 0.02,δHE = 0.03,δHL = 0.01
δgE = 0.05,δHE = 0.06,δHL = 0.03
δgE = 0.1,δHE = 0.1,δHL = 0.1
Fig. 2. The average worst-case sum secrecy rate versus Ptot under NT =
3, NR = 2, NE = 2, and different values of error bounds.
be computed from (33) of Appendix A. Note that mathe-
matically it is possible for the sum secrecy rate Rw to be
negative when the transmit power Ptot is low, but in the
real world, the achievable secrecy rate cannot be negative,
since the information wiretapped by the eavesdropper cannot
be higher than that transmitted by the legitimate transmitter.
Hence, when we encounter negative secrecy sum rate in our
simulations, we have to use max(Rw, 0) to ensure that its
lowest value is zero. Assuming NT = 3, NR = 2 andNE = 2,
in Fig. 2 we show the achievable average Rw versus the total
available transmit power Ptot of the FD BS, subject to the error
bounds δHE , δHL and δgE . When Ptot increases, the strength
of both the confidential signals and the AN also increases.
Therefore, the averageRw increases with Ptot, which has been
validated by our simulation results in Fig. 2. On the other
hand, as the error bounds increase, the CSI estimation of HE ,
HL and gE becomes more and more inaccurate. Therefore,
both the information leakage to the Eve and the jamming
signal (i.e., the AN) leakage to the BS increase with the error
bounds, which results in a secrecy performance degradation.
This argument has been validated by our simulation results in
Fig. 2, showing that smaller error bounds result in a larger
average Rw.
For illustrating the robustness of the proposed secrecy
transmission scheme to imperfect CSI, we show in Fig. 3 how
the achievable average Rw changes upon increasing the error
bounds. For simplicity, we assume δHE = δHL = δgE = ǫ,
Ptot = 10 dBm and NR = 2. We observe that the achievable
average Rw decreases upon increasing ǫ, and the secrecy
performance degradation becomes significant when ǫ increases
from 0.01 to 0.09. Additionally, we see that a largerNE results
in a smaller average Rw. This is because when NE becomes
larger, the wiretapping capability of the Eve becomes stronger,
and the achievable secrecy performance is degraded.
In Fig. 4 we characterize the convergence behaviour of
Algorithm 1 subject to different values of Ptot. It is observed
that the number of iterations required by Algorithm 1 increases
when Ptot becomes larger. This is because upon increasing
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Fig. 4. The average worst-case sum secrecy rate versus Ptot under NT =
4, NR = 2, NE = 2, Pt = 5dBm.
Ptot, the feasible set of the problem (22) is expanded. Addi-
tionally, we see that Algorithm 1 indeed converges in all of
our observations recorded.
For characterizing the performance of our proposed al-
gorithm, we use projection matrix theory to construct a
benchmarker (termed as ”Projection Method”), and use the
analysis results derived in Appendix A to quantify its worst-
case secrecy rate. Since the CSI of the eavesdropping channel
is imperfect, the precoder v is constructed by projecting hB
onto the null-space of the known part of the CSI of the
eavesdropping channel, i.e., H¯E . Explicitly,
v = Pt
UEU
H
EhB
||UEUHEhB||F
, (27)
where, Pt is the transmit power of the information signal, and
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison between the proposed robust strategy and
the projection method under NT = 3, NR = 2, NE = 2dBm.
UE is the null-space of H¯E . For deigning AN, since the self-
interference channel HL and the eavesdropping channel HE
are both imperfect known, we construct the artificial noise in
the null-space of hB and allocate the power of the artificial
noise equally. Explicitly,
Ω =
PNUhBU
H
hB
NT − 1
, (28)
where, PN is the total power of the artificial noise and UhB is
the null-space of hB . We allocate the transmit power equally
between the information signal and AN, i.e., Pt = PN =
Ptot
2 .
Fig. 5 show the secrecy performance achieved both by our
proposed robust strategy and by the ”Projection Method”.
Based on our simulation results, we can find that the secrecy
performance achieved by the proposed robust strategy is much
better than that of the ”Projection Method”, and the gains
become higher upon increasing Ptot, which has confirmed the
efficiency of our proposed robust strategy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the worst-case physical layer
security of a FD system composed of a FD multi-antenna
BS, a “sophisticated/strong” multi-antenna eavesdropper, a
single-antenna UT and a single-antenna DR. Assuming that
only imperfect CSI of the eavesdropping and residual self-
interference channels is available to the FD BS, we have
proposed a robust secrecy transmission scheme, where the
AN and beamforming vector are jointly designed for securing
the confidential signals transmitted from the BS and UT. By
employing the BCD algorithm and linear matrix inequality, we
transform the worst-case non-convex problem into a sequence
of convex problems in order to find its locally optimal solution.
For evaluating the achievable performance, the analysis result
of the worst-case secrecy rate is derived. Furthermore, by
employing the projection matrix theory, we construct another
secrecy transmission scheme for the performance comparison.
Our simulation results have validated the effectiveness of the
proposed secrecy transmission scheme and provided valuable
insights into how several relevant design parameters affect the
achievable secrecy performance of the system considered.
APPENDIX A
ACHIEVABLE WORST-CASE SUM SECRECY RATE
CALCULATION
Invoking Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, we obtain the
optimized rank-1 Q and Ω. Then, the achievable worst-case
sum secrecy rate Rw can be calculated from the objective
function of the problem (7). Firstly, the minimum of η2, i.e,
ηmin2 can be calculated as η
min
2 =
Pt||gB||
2
F
δ2
HL
λmax((Q+Ω)T⊗rrH)+1
.
Then, we calculate the maximum of ln det
(
INE + ZN
−1
)
,
which can be expanded as
ln det
(
INE +HEQH
H
E
(
HEΩH
H
E + INE
)−1)
−
ln
(
1 + tr
(
PtgEg
H
E
(
HE (Ω+Q)H
H
E + INE
)−1)) (a)
=
ln
(
1 + tr
(
HEQH
H
E
(
HEΩH
H
E + INE
)−1))
−
ln
(
1 + tr
(
PtgEg
H
E
(
HE (Ω+Q)H
H
E + INE
)−1))
.
Step (a) holds true, since rank (Q) = 1.
Then, the upper bound of ln det
(
INE + ZN
−1
)
is given
by ln(1 + θ∗1) + ln(1 + θ
∗
2), where
θ∗1 =argminθ1θ1
s.t. θ1 ≥ tr
(
HEQH
H
E
(
HEΩH
H
E + INE
)−1)
,
∀∆HE ∈ ξHE ; (29)
θ∗2 =argminθ2θ2
s.t. θ2 ≥ Pttr
(
gEg
H
E
(
HE (Ω+Q)H
H
E + INE
)−1)
,
∀gE ∈ ξgE , ∀∆HE ∈ ξHE . (30)
After some further manipulations, (29) can be reformulated as
the following semidefinite programming (SDP) problem:
minθ1θ1
s.t.
[
H¯E (θ1Ω−Q) H¯HE H¯E (θ1Ω−Q)
(θ1Ω−Q) H¯HE θ1Ω−Q
]
− tΦ  0,
∃t ≥ 0, (31)
where we have Φ ,
[
INE 0
0 − 1
δ2
HE
]
.
Similarly, after some manipulations, (30) can be reformu-
lated as the following SDP problem:
minθ2θ2
s.t.
[
θ2H¯E (Ω+Q) H¯
H
E + INE − PtgˆE gˆ
H
E θ2H¯E (Ω+Q)
θ2 (Ω+Q) H¯
H
E θ2 (Ω+Q)
]
− η
[
INE 0
0 − 1
δ2
HE
]
 0,
∃η ≥ 0, (32)
where gˆE , g¯E +
g¯E
||g¯E ||F
δgE . Rw is then calculated by
Rw = ln (1 + η1) + ln
(
1 + ηmin2
)
− ln [(1 + θ∗1) (1 + θ
∗
2)] .
(33)
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
For clarity, [30, Corollary 2] is introduced, which is given
as follows.
Corollary 1. Consider the problem
min
X,a
f (X, a) , s.t. (X, a) ∈ X ×A, (34)
where f (X, a) is a continuously differentiable function; X ⊆
Cm×n and A ⊆ R are closed, nonempty, and convex subsets.
Suppose that the sequence
{(
X(n), a(n)
)}
generated by op-
timizing X and a alternatively has limit points. Every limit
point of
{(
X(n), a(n)
)}
is a stationary point of the problem.
We have used matrix inequality for transforming the
problem (11) into the problem (22), equivalently, Therefore,
if we prove that the stationary point of the problem
(11) is the KKT point of the problem (7), and the
same as the stationary point of the problem (22). The
objective function of the problem (22) is continuously
differentiable, and the feasible sets are closed and
convex. Since the objective function of the problem
(22) is nondecreasing in Algorithm 1, due to the power
constraint, by optimizing the two variable sets: (a1, a2.WE)
and (α, β, γ,Q,Ω) alternately, two variable sets have limit
points. Using Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, we can conclude
that
{
a¯1(l), a¯2(l), α¯(l), β¯(l), γ¯(l),W¯E(l), Q¯(l), Ω¯(l)
}
has limit points. Therefore, with [30, Corollary 2],
the limit points generated by Algorithm 1, i.e.,{
a¯∗1, a¯
∗
2, α¯
∗, β¯∗, γ¯∗,W¯∗E , Q¯
∗, Ω¯∗
}
is a stationary point
of the problem (22), and
{
a¯∗1, a¯
∗
2,W¯
∗
E , Q¯
∗, Ω¯∗
}
is a
stationary point of the problem (11).
Next, we will show that the stationary point of the problem
(11) is a KKT point of the problem (7).
Since with Algorithm 2, we can construct Q whose has
one-rank without performance deterioration, the constraint
rank (Q) = 1 of the problem (7) and (11) can be omitted.
For brevity, we denote the objective function of the problem
(7) as ϕ (Q,Ω). Since
{
a¯∗1, a¯
∗
2, α¯
∗, β¯∗, γ¯∗,W¯∗E, Q¯
∗, Ω¯∗
}
is a
stationary point of the problem (11), we have
tr
(
∇QΞ (a
∗
1, a
∗
2,W
∗
E,Q
∗,Ω∗)
H
(Q−Q∗)
)
≤ 0,
tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot
tr
(
∇ΩΞ (a
∗
1, a
∗
2,W
∗
E,Q
∗,Ω∗)
H
(Ω−Ω∗)
)
≤ 0,
tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot
tr
(
∇a1Ξ (a
∗
1, a
∗
2,W
∗
E ,Q
∗,Ω∗)
H
(a1 − a
∗
1)
)
≤ 0, a1 > 0
tr
(
∇a2Ξ (a
∗
1, a
∗
2,W
∗
E ,Q
∗,Ω∗)
H
(a2 − a
∗
2)
)
≤ 0, a2 > 0
(35)
From the equivalent relation (8)-(10), we can obtain
W∗E =
(
INE +HE
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHE + PtgEg
H
E
)−1
(36)
a1 =
(
Pt|g|
2 + hHBΩhB + 1
)−1
(37)
a2 =
(
1 + rHHL
(
vvH +Ω
)
HHL r
)−1
(38)
Substituting (36)-(38) into (35), we can obtain
∇QΞ (a
∗
1, a
∗
2,W
∗
E,Q
∗,Ω∗) = ∇Qϕ (Q
∗,Ω∗)
∇ΩΞ (a
∗
1, a
∗
2,W
∗
E ,Q
∗,Ω∗) = ∇Ωϕ (Q
∗,Ω∗) . (39)
Therefore, with the equation above, we can further obtain
tr
(
∇Qϕ (Q
∗,Ω∗)
H
(Q−Q∗)
)
≤ 0, tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot
tr
(
∇Ωϕ (Q
∗,Ω∗)
H
(Ω−Ω∗)
)
≤ 0, tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot.
(40)
Then, we can conclude that Q∗,Ω∗ is the optimal solution of
the following problem:
max
Q,Ω
tr
(
∇Qϕ (Q
∗,Ω∗)
H
(Q−Q∗)
)
, s.t.tr (Q+Ω) ≤ Ptot
(41)
Hence, Q∗,Ω∗ should satisfy the KKT conditions of the
problem (41), i.e.,
∇Qϕ (Q
∗,Ω∗)− λQI+DQ = 0
Q∗DQ = 0, λQ ≥ 0,DQ  0
∇Ωϕ (Q
∗,Ω∗)− λΩI+DΩ = 0
Q∗DΩ = 0, λΩ ≥ 0,DQ  0, (42)
where DΩ, λΩ, DQ, and λQ are Lagrangian multipliers. The
condition (42) is exactly the KKT codition of the problem (7).
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